Online Appendix for: Democracy and the transnational dimensions of low-level conflict and state repression

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A Alternative proximity measures

A.1 Direct contiguity

Another proximity measure based on geographical distance is direct contiguity. Two countries are directly contiguous if they share a common border. Formally, the corresponding weights are defined as

$$w_{ijt}^{\text{contiguity}} = \begin{cases} 1 & : \tau_{ijt} = 0 \\ 0 & : \tau_{ijt} > 0 \end{cases}. \tag{1}$$

The resulting democracy score of neighboring countries therefore is the arithmetic mean of the democracy scores of all contiguous countries.

A.2 Migrant stocks

International migrants may shape attitudes of friends and family still living in the home country. For instance, Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow (2010) argue that migrants living in democratic countries may foster democratic attitudes of those living in less democratic

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countries via different channels, including migrant returns, cross-border communication, and migrant information networks. Another measure of proximity employed in our empirical analysis therefore is based on bilateral migration stock data provided by Özden et al. (2011).[1] Our migrant stock measure of proximity simply is

$$w_{ijt}^{\text{migrants}} = M_{ijt}, \tag{2}$$

where M_{ijt} denotes the number of migrants from country i living in country j at time t. Hence, the share of the global migrants from country i living in country j serves as the weight when averaging the democracy scores of the neighboring countries. In contrast to the two measures based on geographical distance described above, the migrant-stock approach allows geographically distant countries to serve as reference point for the citizens.

A.3 Ethnic proximity

The literature on the diffusion of civil war provides some evidence that conflict spillovers are particularly likely along ethnic lines (see, e.g., Bosker and de Ree 2014; Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008). Since people may tend to compare their own living conditions with those of members belonging to the same ethnic group abroad, we construct two measures of ethnic proximity. Data on ethnic groups are derived from the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) Core Dataset 2014 (Vogt et al. 2015). The EPR dataset provides information on the population shares of ethnic groups for 165 countries from 1946 to 2013. Our measure of ethnic proximity makes use of these data as follows. Let S_{eit} denote the population share of ethnicity $e = 1, 2, \ldots, E$ in country i at time t. The *ethnic proximity* of country i and country j then is defined as

$$w_{ijt}^{\text{ethnic}} = \sum_{e=1}^{E} S_{eit} \cdot S_{ejt}. \tag{3}$$

Note that (3) represents the probability of randomly drawing two persons (one per country) belonging the same ethnic group from the populations of i and j. Hence, w_{ijt}^{ethnic} ranges between 0 and 1 with higher values indicating greater proximity.

[1] The dataset includes estimates of bilateral migration stocks for the decades of 1960 - 2000. Since the time period covered by our dataset ends in 2011, we use the latest available migrant stock data to construct weights for the years up to 2011.

A.4 Degraded ethnic proximity

While taking ethnic similarity into account, (3) neglects geographical distance between the countries. However, for a given degree of similarity in ethnic structure, populations of geographically proximate countries may form the more important reference group compared to populations of geographically distant countries. For this reason, we additionally consider *degraded ethnic proximity*, which combines degraded distance and ethnic proximity:

$$w_{ijt}^{\text{degraded ethnic}} = w_{ijt}^{\text{degraded}} \cdot w_{ijt}^{\text{ethnic}}. \tag{4}$$

Since degraded distance assigns a weight of 0 to a country if distance exceeds 950 km, $w_{ijt}^{\text{degraded ethnic}}$ only considers the ethnic proximity of geographically proximate countries. Moreover, the highest possible weight of 1 is placed on bordering countries with the same ethnic structure whereas the weight decreases in both ethnic and geographical distance.

Table A1 shows the sample correlations of the neighboring democracy scores calculated using the proximity measures discussed above. While the scores based on measures of geographical distance are highly correlated, the weakest correlation is revealed between the scores based on migrant stocks and those based on ethnic proximity.

Table A1: Correlation matrix of the democracy scores of neighboring countries calculated using different measures of proximity

Proximity measure	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Degraded distance (1)	1				
Direct contiguity (2)	0.94	1			
Migrant stocks (3)	0.69	0.67	1		
Ethnic proximity (4)	0.45	0.48	0.28	1	
Degraded ethnic proximity (5)	0.89	0.96	0.64	0.48	1

The table shows Pearson correlation coefficients. N = 6,908.

B Results for alternative proximity measures

The evidence presented above is based on degraded distance as measure of proximity between two countries. The main regression results obtained by the use of other proximity measures are summarized in table A1. All regressions include the full set of control variables (not shown in the table). Some findings are noteworthy. While the results obtained with direct contiguity as proximity measure are relatively similar to those obtained with degraded distance, this is not true for the migrant stock and the ethnic proximity measure. When measuring proximity based on migrant stocks or ethnic similarity, the coefficients of the interaction terms between domestic and neighboring democracy are insignificant in most of the regressions for indicators of state repression. In contrast to the "raw" measure of ethnic proximity, using degraded ethnic proximity yields a sizable and significantly negative coefficient of the interaction term between the democracy levels at home and abroad. However, there is little evidence for an interaction effect from regressions explaining state repression. On the whole, these results indicate that geographical distance may be more important for the hypothesized mechanisms than other types of distance considered here.

Table A1: Regressions for indicators of low-level conflict and state repression. Alternative proximity measures

Proximity measure	Dependent variable Model	Demonstrations Logit	Strikes Logit	Riots Logit	Reversed PIR Linear FE	Amnesty Linear FE	State Dept. Linear FE
Direct contiguity	Dom. Democracy	1.31***	2.05***	1.49***	-0.03	-0.00	-0.04
		(0.40)	(0.60)	(0.38)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
	Neigh. Democracy	0.81***	1.03***	0.58***	0.02	-0.03*	0.00
		(0.17)	(0.27)	(0.18)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
	Dom. Democracy ×	-0.94***	-0.74**	-0.86***	-0.05**	-0.04*	-0.03*
	Neigh. Democracy	(0.23)	(0.37)	(0.26)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Migrant stocks	Dom. Democracy	1.09**	1.76***	1.20***	-0.02	0.01	-0.04
		(0.43)	(0.67)	(0.40)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
	Neigh. Democracy	0.39***	0.71***	0.33**	-0.00	-0.03*	-0.01
		(0.13)	(0.21)	(0.14)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
	Dom. Democracy ×	-0.22	-0.49*	-0.51**	-0.04*	-0.02	-0.03
	Neigh. Democracy	(0.20)	(0.30)	(0.23)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Ethnic proximity	Dom. Democracy	1.45***	2.37***	1.54***	-0.03	0.00	-0.05
		(0.41)	(0.61)	(0.37)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
	Neigh. Democracy	0.44	-0.16	0.48	0.04	0.03	-0.02
		(0.56)	(0.90)	(0.58)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)
	Dom. Democracy ×	-0.37**	-0.19	-0.32*	-0.03	-0.03	0.00
	Neigh. Democracy	(0.19)	(0.29)	(0.19)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Degraded ethnic proximity	Dom. Democracy	1.40***	2.17***	1.61***	-0.03	0.00	-0.04
		(0.42)	(0.62)	(0.39)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
	Neigh. Democracy	0.66***	1.01***	0.58***	0.03	-0.02	0.02
		(0.22)	(0.27)	(0.19)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
	Dom. Democracy ×	-0.84***	-0.71**	-0.84***	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.03
	Neigh. Democracy	(0.25)	(0.35)	(0.25)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)

Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. The full set of control variables is included but not shown in the table. Abbreviations: FE = Fixed effects, Dom. = Domestic; Neigh. = Neighboring, GDP = Gross Domestic Product.

C Democratic and non-democratic environments

It is also possible to look at relatively more democratic and autocratic neighborhoods separately. As splitting the data is difficult, because countries' neighbourhoods change over time, we created a democratic neighborhood dummy, which equals one if the neighborhood is more democratic than the mean and zero otherwise. We substituted this dummy into the model to replace the continuous version of the indicator for neighboring democracy. The rest of the models stayed the same. Figure C1 depicts all marginal effects that have been also presented in the main text. As can be seen, most results change little, qualitatively. The most noteworthy difference is the negative marginal effect for autocracies in figures C1d-C1f, which is most likely caused by the broad grouping.[2] Compared to the continuous version of the indicator, the neighboring-democracy dummy contains less information. Hence, the estimation process is also less precise as reflected in broader confidence intervals. For this reason we only use it as a robustness test.

[2]Note that using more nuanced groupings, i.e. three categories, yields similar results with insignificant effects in these subfigures for autocratic neighbourhoods. We decided to still use only two categories, because introducing more groups makes the "neighbouring democracy" subfigures more difficult to read.



(a) Anti-government demonstrations

(b) Strikes



(c) Riots

(d) Modified PIR index



(e) Amnesty scores

(f) State Department scores

Figure C1: Marginal effect estimates of domestic and neighboring democracy on conflict and repression indicators with 90% confidence intervals. Note: The underlying models are the same as in the main text, except that neighbouring countries have been split into two groups. Zero indicates relatively autocratic environments, i.e. less democratic than the observed mean, while one indicates a relatively democratic neighborhood, i.e. more democratic than the mean.

D Results for event counts and latent protest scores

In the analyses outlined above, the variables capturing anti-government demonstrations, strikes, and riots have been dichotomized, indicating whether or not an event occurred in a given country-year. However, this involves some loss of information on the severity of conflict that may be reflected in the *number* of events per country-year. Using degraded distance as proximity measure, we therefore estimate fixed effects negative binomial models using the number of events as dependent variables. The results are shown in table D1 (Regression No. 22-24). In line with the logistic regressions presented in the main text, the coefficients of both domestic and neighboring democracy are positive and statistically significant. In addition, the coefficient of the interaction term is negative and significant at the 1% level.

As another extension, we replace the low-level conflict data from Banks and Wilson (2017) with the a latent protest measure provided by Chenoweth, D'Orazio, and Wright (2014). Based on an IRT model, the latent protest scores combine information from eight existing protest datasets. Relative to the data from Banks and Wilson (2017) the latent protest scores therefore draw on a broader set of underlying sources. Since the latent protest scores are mapped onto a continuous scale, we use linear fixed effects regression to test the proposed interaction between domestic and neighboring democracy. The results are also shown in table D1 (Regression No. 25). In line with previous evidence, we find a negative and significant coefficient of the interaction term between domestic and neighboring democracy. Hence, also the use of the latent protest scores supports the implications of the theoretical model.

Table D1: Regressions for count data conflict variables and latent protest. Proximity measure: Degraded distance

Dependent variable	Number of Demonstrations	Number of Strikes	Number of Riots	Latent protest score
Model	FE NB	FE NB	FE NB	linear FE
Regression No.	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)
Dom. Democracy	1.04***	1.39***	1.27***	-0.55
	(0.26)	(0.46)	(0.27)	(0.53)
Neigh. Democracy	1.32***	0.90***	0.85***	0.22
	(0.17)	(0.34)	(0.18)	(0.31)
Dom. Democracy ×	-1.34***	-1.20***	-1.42***	-1.21***
Neigh. Democracy	(0.21)	(0.39)	(0.23)	(0.39)
(Dom. Democracy)^2	-0.45	-0.20	-0.64**	0.79
	(0.31)	(0.55)	(0.32)	(0.73)
Dom. GDP/capita, log.	0.60*	-0.18	0.24	0.10
	(0.33)	(0.67)	(0.36)	(0.71)
Neigh. GDP/capita, log.	0.32	0.13	0.21	-0.04
	(0.31)	(0.64)	(0.34)	(0.68)
Dom. GDP/capita, log. ×	-0.06	-0.00	-0.03	0.00
Neigh. GDP/capita, log.	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.08)
Population, log.	0.19***	0.13	0.08**	0.11
	(0.03)	(0.11)	(0.04)	(0.36)
Youth bulges	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.06***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Dom. high-int. conflict	-0.02	-0.26	0.02	-0.12
	(0.18)	(0.33)	(0.19)	(0.38)
Neigh. high-int. conflict	-0.11	-0.23*	-0.20**	0.07
	(0.08)	(0.14)	(0.08)	(0.14)
Dom. high-int. conflict ×	0.13	0.42	-0.24	-0.29
Neigh. high-int. conflict	(0.19)	(0.36)	(0.21)	(0.40)
Lagged dependent Variable	0.07***	0.24***	0.07***	0.91***
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Observations	7,061	5,189	6,763	6,895
Countries	148	98	141	159
Start Year	1950	1950	1950	1956
End Year	2011	2011	2011	2010

Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Abbreviations: FE = Fixed effects, NB = Negative binomial, Dom. = Domestic; Neigh. = Neighboring, GDP = Gross Domestic Product, log. = logarithmic, high-int = high-intensity.

E Results without lagged dependent variable

In tables E1, E2, and E3 we provide evidence that the major results remain stable if the models are re-estimated without a lagged dependent variable (LDV). For most of the models little changes. For some dependent variables, e.g. the latent protest scores, our hypotheses receive even more support now. For these variables temporal dependencies are high and the LDV takes away almost all the variance of the dependent variable, making it hard to identify relationships.

Table E1: Regressions for dichotomous indicators of low-level conflict. Proximity measure: Degraded distance - without LDV

Dependent variable	Anti-government Demonstrations				Strikes				Riots			
Model	FE Logit	FE Logit	FE Logit	Logit	FE Logit	FE Logit	FE Logit	Logit	FE Logit	FE Logit	FE Logit	Logit
Regression No.	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)	(31)	(32)	(33)	(34)	(35)	(36)	(37)
Dom. Democracy	0.15	0.54***	0.80**	1.14**	1.00***	1.38***	1.25**	2.03***	0.27*	0.77***	1.37***	1.50***
	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.36)	(0.50)	(0.23)	(0.27)	(0.56)	(0.75)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.37)	(0.47)
Neigh. Democracy	0.06	0.82***	0.77***	1.23***	-0.09	0.67*	0.75*	1.70***	-0.13	0.82***	0.78***	0.94***
	(0.19)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.27)	(0.38)	(0.40)	(0.48)	(0.19)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.30)
Dom. Democracy ×		-1.23***	-1.10***	-1.66***		-1.14***	-1.22***	-1.60***		-1.64***	-1.42***	-1.71***
Neigh. Democracy		(0.27)	(0.30)	(0.39)		(0.40)	(0.46)	(0.61)		(0.27)	(0.31)	(0.44)
(Dom. Democracy)^2			-0.37	-0.06			0.22	-0.51			-0.85*	-0.42
			(0.45)	(0.57)			(0.69)	(0.88)			(0.46)	(0.58)
Dom. GDP/capita, log.	-0.12	1.81***	1.80***	1.49***	-0.29	-0.01	-0.23	1.97**	-0.18	0.73	0.61	1.06*
	(0.12)	(0.57)	(0.58)	(0.52)	(0.19)	(0.98)	(1.00)	(0.88)	(0.12)	(0.57)	(0.57)	(0.58)
Neigh. GDP/capita, log.	-0.23	1.58***	1.56***	1.45***	0.50**	0.73	0.51	2.14**	-0.10	0.77	0.62	1.09**
	(0.15)	(0.54)	(0.54)	(0.48)	(0.25)	(0.90)	(0.91)	(0.83)	(0.14)	(0.54)	(0.54)	(0.54)
Dom. GDP/capita, log. ×		-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.16***		-0.03	-0.01	-0.25**		-0.10	-0.09	-0.12*
Neigh. GDP/capita, log.		(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)		(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)		(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Population, log.	0.70***	0.18	0.18	0.49***	0.80**	0.65	0.67	0.35***	0.72***	0.39	0.41	0.48***
	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.05)	(0.38)	(0.45)	(0.46)	(0.08)	(0.25)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.05)
Youth bulges	0.04***	0.03*	0.03*	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.00	-0.02	0.03*	0.02	0.01	0.03**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Dom. high-int. conflict			-0.03	0.19			-0.27	-0.30			0.12	0.23
			(0.27)	(0.33)			(0.38)	(0.33)			(0.27)	(0.47)
Neigh. high-int. conflict			0.01	-0.14			-0.20	-0.15			-0.24**	-0.22
			(0.11)	(0.15)			(0.17)	(0.22)			(0.11)	(0.14)
Dom. high-int. conflict ×			0.23	-0.00			0.53	0.34			-0.20	-0.30
Neigh. high-int. conflict			(0.28)	(0.39)			(0.42)	(0.37)			(0.29)	(0.46)
Observations	7,147	7,147	7,147	7,469	5,245	5,245	5,245	7,469	6,846	6,846	6,846	7,469
Countries	149	149	149	161	99	99	99	161	142	142	142	161
Start year	1950	1950	1950	1950	1950	1950	1950	1950	1950	1950	1950	1950
End year	2011	2011	2011	2011	2011	2011	2011	2011	2011	2011	2011	2011

Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Abbreviations: FE = Fixed effects, Dom. = Domestic; Neigh. = Neighboring, GDP = Gross Domestic Product, log. = logarithmic, high-int = high-intensity.

Table E2: Regressions for indicators of state repression. Proximity measure: Degraded distance - without LDV

Dependent variable	Reversed PIR scores			Amnesty scores			State Department scores		
Model	Linear FE	Linear FE	Linear FE	Linear FE	Linear FE	Linear FE	Linear FE	Linear FE	Linear FE
Regression No.	(38)	(39)	(40)	(41)	(42)	(43)	(44)	(45)	(46)
Dom. Democracy	-0.10***	-0.04	-0.07	-0.10***	-0.04	-0.03	-0.13***	-0.09***	-0.11*
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)
Neigh. Democracy	-0.07*	0.01	0.00	-0.12***	-0.04	-0.06	-0.04	0.03	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Dom. Democracy ×		-0.13**	-0.11**		-0.15***	-0.12**		-0.12**	-0.10**
Neigh. Democracy		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.05)
(Dom. Democracy)^2			0.03			-0.02			0.03
			(0.07)			(0.07)			(0.07)
Dom. GDP/capita, log.	-0.03	0.12	0.13	-0.05*	0.03	0.02	-0.06***	0.11	0.10
	(0.03)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.03)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.02)	(0.11)	(0.09)
Neigh. GDP/capita, log.	-0.02	0.12	0.15	-0.09**	-0.01	-0.00	-0.05	0.12	0.12
	(0.05)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.11)
Dom. GDP/capita, log. ×		-0.02	-0.02		-0.01	-0.01		-0.02	-0.02*
Neigh. GDP/capita, log.		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)
Population, log.	-0.04	-0.10*	-0.05	-0.08	-0.13**	-0.09*	-0.02	-0.08	-0.05
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Youth bulges	0.01**	0.01	0.01*	0.01*	0.00	0.00	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Dom. high-int. conflict			0.19***			0.23***			0.19***
			(0.06)			(0.06)			(0.06)
Neigh. high-int. conflict			0.00			0.02			-0.00
			(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.01)
Dom. high-int. conflict ×			0.04			-0.04			0.02
Neigh. high-int. conflict			(0.05)			(0.05)			(0.06)
Observations	4,322	4,322	4,322	4,252	4,252	4,252	4,895	4,895	4,895
Countries	161	161	161	160	160	160	161	161	161
R^2 (within)	0.10	0.11	0.18	0.08	0.08	0.15	0.16	0.17	0.24
Start year	1981	1981	1981	1976	1976	1976	1976	1976	1976
End Year	2011	2011	2011	2011	2011	2011	2011	2011	2011

Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Abbreviations: FE = Fixed effects, Dom. = Domestic; Neigh. = Neighboring, GDP = Gross Domestic Product, log. = logarithmic, high-int = high-intensity.

Table E3: Regressions for count data conflict variables and latent protest. Proximity measure: Degraded - without LDV distance

Dependent variable	Number of Demonstrations	Number of Strikes	Number of Riots	Latent protest score
Model	FE NB	FE NB	FE NB	linear FE
Regression No.	(47)	(48)	(49)	(50)
Dom. Democracy	1.21***	1.28***	1.35***	3.87
	(0.26)	(0.46)	(0.27)	(3.40)
Neigh. Democracy	1.34***	0.98***	0.90***	3.99**
	(0.17)	(0.34)	(0.18)	(1.59)
Dom. Democracy ×	-1.43***	-1.24***	-1.47***	-5.85***
Neigh. Democracy	(0.21)	(0.39)	(0.23)	(1.99)
(Dom. Democracy)^2	-0.50	-0.03	-0.66**	-1.03
	(0.31)	(0.54)	(0.32)	(4.21)
Dom. GDP/capita, log.	0.67**	-0.13	0.16	-0.17
	(0.33)	(0.68)	(0.36)	(4.52)
Neigh. GDP/capita, log.	0.39	0.35	0.16	0.40
	(0.30)	(0.64)	(0.33)	(4.14)
Dom. GDP/capita, log. ×	-0.06*	-0.02	-0.03	-0.05
Neigh. GDP/capita, log.	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.49)
Population, log.	0.21***	0.15	0.10***	-0.13
	(0.03)	(0.11)	(0.03)	(2.25)
Youth bulges	-0.00	0.01	0.02	0.31**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.13)
Dom. high-int. conflict	-0.05	-0.35	0.03	1.39
	(0.18)	(0.33)	(0.19)	(0.98)
Neigh. high-int. conflict	-0.13*	-0.28**	-0.23***	0.21
	(0.08)	(0.14)	(0.08)	(0.79)
Dom. high-int. conflict ×	0.15	0.46	-0.22	-0.60
Neigh. high-int. conflict	(0.19)	(0.36)	(0.21)	(1.24)
Observations	7,147	5,245	6,846	6,980
Countries	149	99	142	159
Start Year	1950	1950	1950	1955
End Year	2011	2011	2011	2010

Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Abbreviations: FE = Fixed effects, NB = Negative binomial, Dom. = Domestic; Neigh. = Neighboring, GDP = Gross Domestic Product, log. = logarithmic, high-int = high-intensity.

F Alternative repression indicator

As another robustness check, we used the novel latent human rights scores (v4) developed by Fariss (2014), which are based on a latent measurement model. We reversed the scale to measure repression and scaled the scores to range from 0 to 100. Table F1 shows this more recently proposed measure also lends some support in favor of our theory. As can be seen by the huge size of the coefficient for the LDV, temporal dependency is high for the scores, which is a direct consequence of the specification of the underlying latent measurement model (Fariss 2014). Due to this high serial correlation of the repression measure, the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable suppresses the explanatory power of the remaining explantory variables. Still, qualitatively, results do not differ much from the tables presented in the main text. Removing the LDV from the models suggests much more support in favor of the stated hypotheses.

Table F1: Human Rights Protection Scores (inversed). Proximity measure: Degraded distance

Dependent variable	Human Rights Protection Scores					
Model	Linear FE	Linear FE	Linear FE	Linear FE	Linear FE	Linear FE
Regression No.	(51)	(52)	(53)	(54)	(55)	(56)
Dom. Democracy	-0.40**	-0.32	-0.83**	-2.99**	-1.64	-5.89**
	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.40)	(1.23)	(1.48)	(2.55)
Neigh. Democracy	-0.83***	-0.71***	-0.71***	-3.71**	-0.97	-0.72
	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(1.76)	(1.76)	(1.73)
Dom. Democracy ×		-0.21	-0.31		-4.76**	-5.28**
Neigh. Democracy		(0.28)	(0.34)		(2.12)	(2.13)
(Dom. Democracy)^2			0.64			5.55*
			(0.57)			(3.35)
Dom. GDP/capita, log.	0.03	-0.17	-0.12	-3.16***	11.68**	11.02**
	(0.13)	(0.51)	(0.53)	(0.88)	(5.01)	(4.69)
Neigh. GDP/capita, log.	-0.26*	-0.45	-0.34	0.02	14.07***	13.71***
	(0.14)	(0.47)	(0.46)	(1.17)	(4.86)	(4.49)
Dom. GDP/capita, log. ×		0.02	0.01		-1.68***	-1.60***
Neigh. GDP/capita, log.		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.57)	(0.53)
Population, log.	0.81***	0.82***	0.95***	10.61***	7.00***	7.47***
	(0.27)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(2.53)	(2.61)	(2.36)
Youth bulges	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.37***	0.39***	0.37***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.13)
Dom. high-int. conflict			1.32***			6.98***
			(0.40)			(2.50)
Neigh. high-int. conflict			0.16			0.78
			(0.10)			(0.61)
Dom. high-int. conflict ×			-0.41			2.13
Neigh. high-int. conflict			(0.39)			(2.44)
Lagged dependent Variable	0.94***	0.94***	0.93***			
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)			
Observations	7,555	7,555	7,555	7,573	7,573	7,573
Countries	160	160	160	161	161	161
R^2 (within)	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.25	0.28	0.34
Start year	1950	1950	1950	1950	1950	1950
End Year	2011	2011	2011	2011	2011	2011

Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Abbreviations: FE = Fixed effects, Dom. = Domestic; Neigh. = Neighboring, GDP = Gross Domestic Product, log. = logarithmic, high-int = high-intensity.

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